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What’s wrong with the world today? 
Things just got to get better 
Sho’ ain’t what the leaders say 
Maybe we should write a letter 
Said dear Mr. Man, we don’t understand 
Why poor people keep struggling 
But you don’t lend a helping hand 
Matthew 5:5 say, 
The meek shall inherit the Earth. 
. . . 
Who told me, Mr. Man, that working round the clock 
Would buy me a big house in the hood, with cigarette ads 
on every block? 
Who told me, Mr. Man, that I got a right to moan? 
How ‘bout this big ol’ hole in the ozone? 
. . . 
Listen, ain’t no sense in voting, same song with a different 
name 
Might not be in the back of the bus but it sho’ feel just the 
same 
Ain’t nothing fair about welfare, ain’t no assistance in aids 
2
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Ain’t nothing affirmative about your actions till the 
people get paid 
Your thousand years are up, now you gotta share the land 
Section I, the 14th Amendment says, 
No state shall deprive any person of life 
Liberty or property, without due process of law 
Mr. Man, we want to end this letter with three words 
We tired a-y’all1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Prince’s lyrics ring true today. Although prescient in 2004, 
before the recession set back the North and South Minneapolis 
neighborhoods in which he grew up, Prince addressed the growing 
concerns that any Legal Aid lawyer knows full well: the frustration 
and anger from low-income people of color, immigrants, and 
others struggling in the midst of desperate personal circumstances, 
dilapidated housing conditions, and exploitative rental practices. 
Housing discrimination litigation, and disparate-impact claims in 
particular, have struggled to make headway on these issues. 
Moreover, housing development policies have failed the 
communities they were supposed to serve,2 making it difficult to 
improve existing affordable housing stock and to enable families to 
make real choices about where they can live. 
Today, community awareness of housing conditions, rental 
practices, and the historic antecedents of these conditions and 
practices is especially acute. Still unclear is how to systemically 
address these problems. After decades of trying to increase housing 
opportunity by fighting against housing segregation, demographic 
statistics tell us that, overall, there has been little improvement.3 
The Twin Cities metro area remains one of the most racially 
segregated urban landscapes in the country.4 Legal Aid attorneys 
also know from decades of representing minority families facing 
1.  PRINCE, Dear Mr. Man, on MUSICOLOGY (NPG Records 2004).
2.  See INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO 
SEGREGATED? 6–7 (2015), https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/ed/00 
/ed00c05a000fffeb881655f2e02e9f29/Why-Are-the-Twin-Cities-So-Segregated-2-26 
-15.pdf. 
3.  See id. at 1 (“The concentration of black families in low-income areas has
grown for over a decade; in Portland and Seattle, it has declined.”). 
4.  See id.
3
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housing discrimination that much work remains to be done in this 
area.5 
One tool to combat discrimination has seen some resurgence 
in recent years: the disparate-impact claim brought under the 
federal Fair Housing Act.6 This claim asserts that facially neutral 
policies of government- and private-sector actors have a 
discriminatory effect on minority populations.7 This claim’s use 
may be a particularly effective strategy in parts of the country where 
much of the discriminatory activity tends to be more subterranean 
than overt—more “Minnesota Nice” than in-your-face obvious. 
This article discusses the development of fair-housing 
disparate-impact jurisprudence and its current resurgence in the 
Twin Cities. Part II sets out the types of housing discrimination 
issues seen in a legal aid practice in the Twin Cities.8 Part III reviews 
the development of fair-housing disparate-impact cases around the 
nation and recent Housing and Urban Development rule 
promulgation governing disparate-impact order-of-proof criteria.9 
Part IV discusses the trajectory of fair-housing disparate-impact 
jurisprudence closer to home in the Eighth Circuit.10 Finally, Part V 
assesses the current state of litigation involving disparate-impact 
claims in the Twin Cities and how these claims might be used in the 
future on behalf of Legal Aid’s client communities.11 
5. References to Legal Aid in this article reflect the experiences of legal aid
attorneys at Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where there has 
been a separate housing discrimination unit since the mid-1990s, who represent 
low-income people in central Minnesota in housing discrimination matters. This 
author’s discussions with other legal aid attorneys and housing discrimination 
advocates around the country, however, indicate that these experiences are not 
unique to Minnesota nor the Twin Cities. 
6. The Fair Housing Act is a federal law enacted as Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19, 3631 (2012)). Its purpose is to provide, within 
constitutional limits, fair housing throughout the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 3601. 
7.  See Disparate Impact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
8.  See infra Part II.
9.  See infra Part III.
10.  See infra Part IV.
11.  See infra Part V.
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II. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: WHAT LEGAL AID SEES IN THE TWIN
CITIES 
Legal Aid staff face a relentless flood of housing discrimination 
complaints presented by their clients. Many of these complaints 
involve differential treatment based on protected class membership 
that is not difficult to decode. Horrific accounts of racial and sexual 
harassment, outright refusals to rent, and evictions—stemming 
from discrimination based on race, national origin, and disability—
form the heart of Legal Aid’s housing discrimination practice. It 
does not seem to matter whether the property is located in the 
Twin Cities’ urban core or its sprawling suburban/exurban metro 
area: poor people from minority communities bear the brunt of 
discriminatory conduct in housing.12 And, the poorer and more 
vulnerable the individual, the worse the effects of housing 
discrimination. Ironically, these are the people whom our federal 
and state fair-housing laws were designed to protect the most: poor, 
often disabled, single mothers from protected classes.13 Indeed, one 
commentator writing recently about housing instability in poor 
urban neighborhoods in America summarized this situation as 
reflected in the African American community: “If incarceration had 
come to define the lives of men from impoverished black 
neighborhoods, eviction was shaping the lives of women. Poor 
black men were locked up. Poor black women [and their families] 
were locked out.”14 
Less outright offensive than this sort of differential treatment, 
but perhaps more insidious in perpetuating discrimination and 
segregation, are facially neutral policies sometimes used by Twin 
12.  See generally Alex M. Johnson Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent
Integration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 
1595 (1995). 
13. The purpose of the federal Fair Housing Act is to “ensure the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers when the barriers operate invidiously 
to discriminate on the basis of impermissible characteristics.” United States v. 
Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff’d, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 
1981). While the Fair Housing Act only protects from discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, and national origin, many 
states have laws that go beyond this scope to protect against discrimination on the 
basis of characteristics such as income level and marital status. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 
§ 363A.09 (2016); see also ROBERT SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
LITIGATION § 11:1 (2012). 
14.  MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
98 (2016). 
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Cities landlords and local housing authorities. Such policies result 
in the very exclusion that many fair-housing laws are designed to 
prevent. This includes rental policies that require tenants to have 
clean criminal records15 and post income that is three times the 
rent.16 They may also create policies, written or unwritten, that 
result in persons with disabilities being denied housing due to 
purported concerns about safety. From Legal Aid’s experience, 
these policies have been difficult to combat legally and may very 
well be part of the reason housing segregation in and around the 
Twin Cities persists. 
What can we do to meet clients’ needs and make headway 
against facially neutral housing practices that continue to 
perpetuate long-standing patterns of segregation? One tool may be 
the recently revitalized fair-housing claim that alleges disparate 
impact, a theory of liability that does not depend on proving 
discriminatory intent. As this article describes, advocates’ historical 
experiences with bringing these sorts of claims have been a mixed 
bag, to say the least. In Legal Aid’s experience, many judges have 
not been kind to these claims. Consequently, it has been difficult 
for advocates practicing in this area to discern the legal standards 
for the order of proof that will result in success, not to mention the 
statistical presentations that would be persuasive to triers of fact or 
appellate reviewers. However, developments in disparate-impact 
jurisprudence and federal rulemaking have now made order-of-
proof methodology much clearer. Fair-housing advocates, as a 
result, can more realistically assess the prospects of using disparate 
impact as an additional tool to address more systemic 
manifestations of housing discrimination affecting client 
communities. 
15.  Cf. Samuel M. Johnson, Your “Permanent Record” Under Minnesota’s
Expungement Laws: The Process and Opportunities for Change, HENNEPIN LAW., 
July/Aug. 2016, at 8, 8 n.1. (“[A]s many as one in four Minnesotans have a 
criminal record . . . .”). 
16.  Cf. MINN. STAT. § 504B.175 (2016) (showing that Minnesota law puts no
maximum limitation on the amount a landlord may require a tenant to pay to 
secure a lease). 
6
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III. THE SUPREME COURT’S 2015 STAMP OF APPROVAL FOR FAIR-
HOUSING DISPARATE-IMPACT CLAIMS’ COGNIZABILITY IN TEXAS 
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & COMMUNITY AFFAIRS V. INCLUSIVE 
COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC. 
Part of the difficulty in bringing a successful disparate-impact 
case under the Fair Housing Act comes from the expansive 
language of the statute itself, which makes it challenging to prove 
discriminatory intent. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (“FHA” or 
“Fair Housing Act”) was enacted to ban various housing practices, 
such as: refusing to sell or rent real property; imposing unfair terms 
or conditions in a sale or tenancy; using discriminatory 
advertisements or statements; misrepresenting the availability of 
housing; “blockbusting”17; failing to provide equal housing 
opportunities for persons with disabilities; and coercing, 
intimidating, threatening, or interfering with the exercise of fair-
housing rights.18 The statute’s causation language banned 
discrimination in these substantive areas “because of” race, color, 
national origin, religion, and sex19 and, in 1988, handicap and 
familial status.20 
Congress did not define “because of,” although applicability of 
the FHA to unfair housing practices has been fairly straightforward 
when discriminatory intent was clear.21 In contrast, FHA protections 
are more difficult to obtain when a landlord acts with innocent 
motives, but his or her conduct results in discriminatory effects.22 In 
17.  “Blockbusting [is a] real estate practice in which brokers encourage
owners to list their homes for sale by exploiting fears of racial change within their 
neighborhood.” Dmitri Melhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and 
Race-Based Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1998). 
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012); SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 4:4.
19. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1968) (refusal to sell or rent);
id. § 3604(b) (discrimination in terms or conditions of sale or rental); id. 
§ 3604(d) (misrepresentations of housing availability); id. § 3604(f)(1) (failure to
sell or rent to persons with handicap); id. § 3604(f)(2) (discrimination against 
persons with handicap in terms or conditions of sale or rental); id. § 3605(a) 
(discrimination by persons in real estate business). 
20.  See Fair Housing Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 9(b), 102 Stat. 1622
(1988). 
21.  See SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 10:1 (noting the phrase “because of”
identifies whether a housing practice is unlawful: “it would apply when the sole 
reason for a defendant’s action is the race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial 
status, or national origin of the person dealt with”). 
22.  See id.; see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev., 429 U.S.
7
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general, courts allow fair-housing cases based on disparate-impact 
claims to proceed, at least past the pleadings stage, by borrowing 
from landmark Supreme Court decisions on employment 
discrimination such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co.23 
In the past decade, housing advocates embraced the disparate 
impact doctrine as a tool to target neighborhood segregation, and 
the federal government developed a disparate-impact rule 
recognizing disparate-impact claims under the FHA. As such, much 
has transpired in disparate-impact litigation across the country in 
recent years. Much of the impetus for using disparate impact as a 
tool to combat residential housing segregation, particularly in the 
rental market, has come from significant housing discrimination 
cases brought in places like New Jersey and Texas.24 Moreover, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development has done its part 
to support fair-housing enforcement by promulgating its disparate-
impact rule,25 which sets out the preferred order of proof for 
disparate-impact claims.26 After years of uncertainty regarding the 
viability of bringing disparate-impact claims under the FHA, the 
Supreme Court finally settled the issue of fair-housing disparate-
impact claim cognizability and the validity of the federal disparate-
impact rule in 2015 in Texas Department of Housing & Community 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.27 It is necessary to explore 
the development of the disparate impact doctrine before turning to 
the treatment of fair-housing disparate-impact claims in the Eighth 
Circuit. 
252 (1977) (discussing a real estate developer who alleged that the refusal of local 
officials to re-zone a housing tract from single-family to multi-family was racially 
discriminatory and not simply motivated by a desire to protect property values). 
23. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See SCHWEMM, supra note 13, §§ 10:4–7, 10:29–58,
for a comprehensive examination of how housing discrimination disparate-impact 
case decisions have developed since the 1960s. Recent scholarship likewise 
summarizes the evolution of the Fair Housing Act, its implementation of federal 
regulations, and disparate-impact jurisprudence. See, e.g., Eric W.M. Bain, Another 
Missed Opportunity to Fix Discrimination in Discrimination Law, 38 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1434 (2012). 
24.  See, e.g., Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount
Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011); Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of 
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312 (N.D. Tex. 2012). 
25.  See William F. Fuller, What’s HUD Got to do With it? How HUD’s Disparate
Impact Rule May Save the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2047 (2015). 
26.  Id.
27. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
8
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A. New Jersey Legal Aid Defends Fair-Housing Rights for Low-Income 
Residents in Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. 
Township of Mount Holly 
The Mount Holly case arose out of redevelopment plans 
hatched in 2000.28 The plan involved the demolition of housing 
primarily occupied by poor African American and Hispanic 
residents.29 Three hundred twenty-nine homes comprised of two-
story solid brick buildings built in the 1950s, an adjacent 
playground, and a community center were destroyed.30 Half of 
these homes were rental properties.31 These homes were to be 
replaced by “significantly more expensive housing units” in the 
overall township gentrification scheme.32 The planning process 
itself adversely impacted residents; while plan development 
puttered along in fits and starts for several years, the neighborhood 
gradually emptied out.33 
The resulting class action lawsuit, including disparate-impact 
claims, was brought on behalf of the local low-income housing 
rights association.34 The plaintiffs were represented by New Jersey 
Legal Services and assisted by the AARP Foundation Litigation and 
private counsel.35 The lawsuit then wended its way through state 
court, and the anti-discrimination claims—which had not been ripe 
for adjudication in state court—were refiled in federal court.36 
Motions to dismiss were converted into motions for summary 
judgment and then dismissed; the federal district court judge 
found the evidence presented no prima facie case and identified 
no alternative course of action with lesser impact.37 On appeal to 
the Third Circuit, the court reversed the summary judgment grant 
and found that prima facie standards for proving disparate impact 
had been “misapplied” in the earlier stages of litigation and all 
reasonable inferences had not been drawn in the plaintiffs’ favor.38  
28.  See Mount Holly, 658 F.3d at 377.
29.  Id.
30.  Id. at 378.
31.  Id.
32.  Id.
33.  See id. at 378–80.
34.  Id.
35.  Id. at 377.
36.  See id. at 380–81.
37.  Id. at 381.
38.  Id. at 377.
9
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The reversal allowed the disparate-impact claims to proceed, 
pendant on further development of the factual record, and 
preserved the possibility for future remedies.39 
The Township filed for certiorari with the United States 
Supreme Court for further review of the disparate-impact claims, 
which was subsequently granted on the issue of the cognizability of 
disparate-impact claims brought under the Fair Housing Act.40 The 
parties settled the case a few weeks before oral argument, 
scheduled for early December 2013, and the Supreme Court 
dismissed the case two days later.41 The parties settled mainly due to 
housing advocates’ concerns about how the Fair Housing Act’s 
disparate-impact liability would fare at the Supreme Court given 
the Court’s political make-up at the time.42 
Although Mount Holly stopped short of Supreme Court 
clarification about the feasibility of disparate-impact claims, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), the 
federal agency primarily responsible for enforcing the Fair Housing 
Act, moved forward with its own interpretation of disparate impact. 
HUD completed promulgating its discriminatory effect rulemaking 
procedures just before certiorari was granted in Mount Holly.43 The 
promulgation of the HUD rule, as well as other disparate-impact 
litigation brought around the country, later culminated in a 
Supreme Court decision on disparate impact.44 
B. HUD Disparate-Impact Rule: Promulgated to Clarify and Standardize 
Disparate-Impact Order-of-Proof Test 
HUD’s new 2013 rule formalized its interpretation of 
discriminatory effects liability under the Fair Housing Act.45 The 
39.  See id. at 387.
40. Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2824, 2824 (2013) (mem.). 
41.  See Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (mem.). 
42. Interview with Susan Ann Silverstein, Esq., in Minneapolis, Minn. (Feb.
15, 2013). 
43.  Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. 
pt. 100). 
44.  See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs,
860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 313–14 (N.D. Tex. 2012). 
45.  See generally Fuller, supra note 25.
10
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hope was that the rule would resolve minor variations on how 
disparate impact was applied around the country, provide for 
“consistent and predictable application of the test on a national 
basis,” and offer “clarity to persons seeking housing and persons 
engaged in housing transactions as to how to assess potential claims 
involving discriminatory effects.”46 
The new HUD disparate-impact rule set out the long-standing 
three-step burden-shifting test for establishing liability: 
(1) [Complainant] has the burden of proving that a 
challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a 
discriminatory effect.[47] 
(2) Once [complainant] satisfies [this prima facie] 
burden of proof . . . defendant has the burden of proving 
that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or 
more [of its] substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
interests . . . . 
(3) If . . . defendant satisfies [its] burden of proof . . . 
[complainant] may still prevail upon proving that the 
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests 
supporting the challenged practice could be served by 
another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.48 
HUD assessed this allocation of the burden of proof as “the fairest 
and most reasonable approach” to resolving claims.49 An added 
advantage was its consistency with the discriminatory effects 
standards codified by Congress for employment discrimination 
cases,50 as well as criteria used for discriminatory effects in lending 
cases under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.51 Factually similar 
claims were now treated the same way, no matter which civil rights 
law governed the case, reducing confusion and promoting more 
46.  Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,460. 
47. HUD defined this as follows: “[a] practice has a discriminatory effect
where it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons 
or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns 
because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” 
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2016). 
48.  Id. § 100.500(c).
49.  Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,473–74. 
50.  See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k) (1972).
51.  See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,474. 
11
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consistent decisionmaking by finders of fact.52 HUD’s new rule was 
quickly put to the test by the Supreme Court in a very different sort 
of fair-housing case—one seeking to affect the dispersal of low-
income housing funding. 
C. Housing Advocates in Dallas, Texas, Challenge Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit Allocation in Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. 
Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs 
Dallas’s Inclusive Communities Project (“DICP”) joined the 
significant disparate-impact litigation activities nationwide with its 
2008 lawsuit against Texas state housing authorities.53 In its suit, 
DICP challenged the allocation of tax credits to developers under 
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”) program.54 The 
parties alleged that tax credits were disproportionately allocated to 
housing projects in racially segregated, economically distressed 
areas and were insufficiently allocated to white suburbs with better 
education and employment opportunities.55 The case went through 
bench trial proceedings, and the federal district court found that 
plaintiffs had proved disparate impact liability.56 
On appeal, the state argued that burden-of-proof standards 
had been incorrectly applied by the trial court; the Fifth Circuit 
agreed and reversed the finding of liability on the disparate-impact 
claim and remanded the case for application of order-of-proof 
standards set out in the new HUD disparate-impact rule.57 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari regarding the 
cognizability of disparate-impact claims under the Fair Housing Act 
and the differing order-of-proof criteria.58 
Affirming the Fifth Circuit’s decision, Justice Kennedy, writing 
for the 5-4 majority, endorsed the use of disparate-impact claims in 
carrying out the Fair Housing Act’s goal to increase racial 
52. See id.
53.  See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs,
860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 313–14 (N.D. Tex. 2012), rev’d, 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), 
aff’d and remanded sub nom. Tex. Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
54.  Id. at 314.
55.  Id. at 314–15.
56.  Id. at 313–14, 321.
57.  Inclusive Cmtys., 747 F.3d 275.
58. Tex. Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 46 (2015) (mem.). 
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integration in American society, putting a Supreme Court 
imprimatur on HUD’s new disparate-impact rule.59 He noted that 
disparate-impact theory “plays an important role in uncovering 
discriminatory intent: It permits plaintiffs to counteract 
unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy 
classification as disparate treatment.”60 
Clearly troubled by this novel challenge to a state tax credit 
allocation program, however, Justice Kennedy set out some 
“cautionary standards” that should be taken into account when 
evaluating disparate-impact claims.61 He opined that fair housing 
enforcement should not displace “valid government policies” but 
rather should more appropriately focus on the “remov[al of] 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.”62 One commentator 
summarized the Court’s limitations as follows: 
Thus, a plaintiff’s mere showing of racial imbalance would 
“not, without more, establish a prima facie case of 
disparate impact,” and a plaintiff must prove a “robust” 
causal connection between the defendant’s challenged 
practice and any statistical disparities. Even if these 
elements are shown, a defendant could still prevail by 
proving that its challenged policy is “necessary to achieve 
a valid interest.” Finally, with respect to the less-
discriminatory-alternative phase of [a Fair Housing Act] 
impact claim, the [Inclusive Communities] opinion 
indicated agreement with HUD’s regulation that this 
burden should be placed on the plaintiff.63 
Highlighting cases it believed to be worthier applications of 
disparate-impact liability—such as racially exclusionary zoning 
practices in predominantly white suburbs—the Court appeared 
skeptical about the prospects for the case’s success on remand.64 
59. Tex. Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015). 
60.  Id. at 2511–12.
61.  Id. at 2524.
62.  Id. at 2522, 2524 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971)). 
63. Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive Communities:
What’s New and What’s Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106, 111 (2015) (quoting 
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514, 2523, 2524). 
64.  Id. At the time, the plaintiffs’ challenge to Texas’s tax credit allocation
was a novel disparate impact challenge. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522. 
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The majority’s concern about what sorts of fair-housing 
disparate-impact cases would be brought in the wake of Inclusive 
Communities was echoed and underscored by that case’s dissenting 
justices.65 Indeed, Justice Alito’s sternly worded dissent (joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas) pinpointed 
the “rats” he sought to avoid on behalf of impoverished 
communities everywhere.66 Interestingly enough, the case that 
apparently fueled Justice Alito’s ire was one that emanated from 
the Eighth Circuit, Gallagher v. Magner, which involved a challenge 
to St. Paul’s housing code enforcement program brought by 
adversely affected local landlords on behalf of their poor and 
minority tenants.67 A theory of liability that could produce a case 
like Gallagher (discussed in the next section), was, to Justice Alito, a 
blanket reason to deny disparate-impact liability to all aspiring 
litigants: “Something has gone badly awry when a city can’t even 
make slumlords kill rats without fear of a lawsuit.”68 
Amongst discussion of how disparate-impact liability would 
now fare at the Supreme Court and speculation about how HUD 
might react in the wake of Inclusive Communities, fair-housing 
practitioners are left somewhere in the middle. On the positive 
side, no longer do any precious litigation resources need to be 
spent arguing the basic validity of disparate-impact claims under 
the Fair Housing Act. Less certain, however, is how disparate-
impact litigation will fare for the more creative disparate impact 
theories of liability that have been put to use in recent years, 
particularly when applied to challenge various kinds of 
government-sponsored low-income housing programs. In the 
Eighth Circuit, the overall amount of jurisprudence analyzing fair-
housing disparate-impact claims is relatively small. However, 
enough can be extracted to give fair-housing practitioners a sense 
of how various kinds of cases will fare going forward. 
65.  See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2532
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
66.  Id. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing a Minnesota federal district court
case in which landlords who sought to exterminate their buildings of rats were 
sued under a theory of disparate impact) (“No one wants to live in a rat’s nest.”). 
67.  See 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010).
68.  Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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IV. UNDERSTANDING THE TRAJECTORY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF DISPARATE-IMPACT LITIGATION AND ITS JUDICIAL 
TREATMENT IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT: PAST AND PRESENT
The Eighth Circuit is no stranger to lawsuits brought by public-
interest housing advocates addressing the age-old problem of 
housing segregation within its regional confines. This Part will 
discuss the development of disparate-impact lawsuits brought 
under the Fair Housing Act from the early 1970s to the present day 
and how the Supreme Court has evolved in developing doctrine 
and criteria for analyzing claims in this area. This Part will 
conclude with how this jurisprudence may be affected by the new 
HUD rule and the Supreme Court’s warnings regarding future 
disparate-impact liability under the Fair Housing Act in Inclusive 
Communities. 
A. 1974: United States v. City of Black Jack 
The most notable example of disparate-impact jurisprudence’s 
long history in the Eighth Circuit is Judge Heaney’s69 thoughtful 
and resolute opinion in 1974.70 This opinion reversed a Missouri 
federal judge’s dismissal of fair-housing disparate-impact claims in 
United States v. City of Black Jack.71 Given the racially divided times we 
live in, it is worth spending time to lay out the factual 
circumstances giving rise to the case. The City of Black Jack is a 
first-ring suburb of St. Louis, Missouri. This is a region of the 
country where deeply entrenched patterns of housing segregation 
and acute racial tensions continue to this day.72 In the late 1960s, 
one proposed solution to these problems was a planned housing 
development in an area previously governed by St. Louis County.73 
69. In 1991, I had the honor of getting to know Judge Heaney, who had
given over his visiting chambers in St. Paul to the newly appointed Judge Loken 
and his staff. As a member of Judge Loken’s staff, I spent a fair amount of time 
with Judge Heaney himself in those first few months; my memories of him include 
his warmth and gentle wit, and unfailing graciousness to all. 
70. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), reh’g
denied, (1975). 
71.  Id.
72.  See Daniel Marans, Why Missouri Has Become the Heart of Racial Tension In
America, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2015, 1:04 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-mizzou-missouri-racial-tension 
_us_564736e2e4b08cda3488f34d. 
73. See City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1182.
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The county adopted a master plan for municipal development in 
this area in 1965.74 By 1970, the area was still largely undeveloped 
and remained focused on single-family homes.75 
In 1969, the Inter Religious Center for Urban Affairs (ICUA) 
entered the picture when it began planning “alternative housing 
opportunities for persons of low and moderate income living in the 
ghetto areas of St. Louis.”76 ICUA’s foray into the City of Black Jack 
came in the form of a federally subsidized 108-unit townhouse 
development in a previously unsettled part of the municipality 
called “Park View Heights.”77 Predictably, surrounding white 
communities mounted a “swift and active” opposition to the 
project.78 Despite HUD’s green light for project funding, local 
opposition coalesced in petitions to the St. Louis County Council 
that resulted in an abrupt scuttling of the project and a city 
ordinance that prohibited multiple-family dwellings in the area.79 
HUD struck back with a lawsuit claiming the city ordinance 
violated the recently enacted Fair Housing Act and asserted race-
based claims of illegal housing discrimination under both 
differential treatment and disparate-impact theories.80 The U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri allowed the 
claims past the pleading stage but dismissed the case and found 
that no violation had been proven under either theory of liability.81 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit judges sitting on the panel were 
Judges Heaney, Bright, and Ross.82 In a unanimous decision, the 
court reversed the dismissal and allowed the case to go forward 
under a disparate-impact theory of liability.83 The Eighth Circuit’s 
ruling would stand, as the Supreme Court denied the subsequent 





78.  Id. at 1182, 1186–87.
79.  Id. at 1183.
80. United States v. City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
81.  Id. at 327.
82.  Id.
83. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied sub nom. City of Blackjack v. United States, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (mem.), 
reh’g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975) (mem.). 
84.  City of Blackjack, 422 U.S. 1042.
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Writing for the panel, Judge Heaney identified the particular 
demographic statistics that could be used to prove liability and put 
the statistics into historical context: 
The [district court’s] conclusion [finding no statistical 
proof of discriminatory effect from the city ordinance] 
was in error . . . . The ultimate effect of the ordinance was 
to foreclose 85 percent of the blacks living in the 
metropolitan area from obtaining housing in Black Jack, 
and to foreclose them at a time when 40 percent of them 
were living in substandard or overcrowded units. 
The discriminatory effect of the ordinance is more 
onerous when assessed in light of the fact that segregated 
housing in the St. Louis metropolitan area was . . . in large 
measure the result of deliberate racial discrimination in 
the housing market by the real estate industry and by 
agencies of the federal, state, and local governments.85 
Judge Heaney went on to outline the correct order of proof to 
be followed on remand, starting with the requirements for a 
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case86: 
[First,] [t]o establish a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination, the plaintiff need prove no more than that 
the conduct of the defendant actually or predictably 
results in racial discrimination; in other words, that it has 
a discriminatory effect. . . . Effect, and not motivation, is 
the touchstone, in part because clever men may easily 
conceal their motivations, but more importantly, because 
whatever our law was once, . . . we now firmly recognize 
that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as 
disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public 
interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.[87] 
[Second,] [o]nce the [prima facie case is established], 
the burden shifts to the governmental defendant to 
demonstrate that its conduct was necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest.88 
The court then determines whether any of these justifications 
rise to such a level by examining several factors: 
85. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186 (internal citations omitted) (quoting
City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. at 326) (quoting the district court opinion’s factual 
findings, stipulated to by the parties, regarding discriminatory intent against poor 
urban minorities moving out to the country). 
86.  Id. at 1184.
87.  Id. at 1184–85 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
88.  Id.
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[F]irst, whether the ordinance in fact furthers the 
governmental interest asserted; second, whether the 
public interest served by the ordinance is constitutionally 
permissible and is substantial enough to outweigh the 
private detriment caused by it; and third, whether less 
drastic means are available whereby the stated 
governmental interest may be attained.89 
Judge Heaney found the district court’s discriminatory effect 
analysis lacking and pointed out that claims asserted in the lawsuit 
by the City defendant were based on incorrect information that the 
proposed development would impede traffic, overcrowd local 
schools, and devalue homes.90 He was similarly unimpressed by 
other reasons advanced by the defendants and noted the lack of 
substance in the evidence proffered by defendants, both 
quantitative and qualitative.91 The result was a remand to the 
district court “with instructions . . . to enter a permanent 
injunction . . . enjoining the enforcement of the ordinance.”92 
City of Black Jack is significant for its early endorsement of the 
disparate-impact burden-shifting test, which closely mirrored the 
discriminatory effects rule formalized by HUD twenty years later.93 
Moreover, the resulting victory for the forces of racial housing 
integration and development of decent, affordable housing for low-
income persons was all the more meaningful because it took place 
in the nation’s heartland; this, after all, was the same part of the 
country from which emanated the infamous Dred Scott decision 
more than a hundred years before.94 
B. 2005: Eighth Circuit Preserves Low-Income Housing in Charleston 
Housing Authority v. USDA and Ventura Village, Inc. v. City of 
Minneapolis 
Years after City of Black Jack, disparate-impact litigation in this 
region continued to focus on challenges to the development of 
federally funded low-income housing. Two fair-housing cases 
featuring disparate-impact claims were heard by the Eighth Circuit 
89.  Id. at 1187.
90.  Id.
91.  Id. at 1188.
92.  Id.
93.  See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2013).
94.  See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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in 2005 and resulted in preservation of housing for communities of 
racial minorities.95 
1. Public Housing Preserved in Charleston Housing Authority v.
USDA
In the late 1990s housing advocates in this region addressed 
the difficult problem of public housing redevelopment in 
Charleston, Missouri. A tiny town of about 5900, Charleston tips 
the Mississippi delta at the far southeastern corner of the state.96 
There, the local housing authority had adopted a policy of “poverty 
deconcentration.”97 The public housing at issue was a Section 8 
building complex of fifty rental units in a cluster of twenty-two 
separate buildings.98 The plan was for some of these units to be 
demolished; forty-six of the forty-seven occupied units were 
occupied by African American tenants.99 
The resulting litigation featured most of the local and federal 
stakeholders in the project. One of the lawsuits was brought by the 
tenants and a local nonprofit to save the project and alleged 
disparate-impact claims, among other things.100 At trial, the court 
found for the tenants on the merits, enjoined the demolition, and 
found Fair Housing Act disparate-impact violations based on 
race.101 On appeal, Judge Melloy wrote for the panel and affirmed 
the district court’s decision.102 The court found that plaintiffs met 
their prima facie burden by demonstrating that “the objected-to 
action results in, or can be predicted to result in, a disparate impact 
upon a protected class compared to a relevant population as a 
whole.”103 Reviewing the evidentiary record, Judge Melloy noted 
95.  See infra notes 97, 110.
96.  CITY OF CHARLESTON, www.charlestonmo.us (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
97. Charleston Hous. Auth. v. USDA, 419 F.3d 729, 733 (8th Cir. 2005).
98.  Id.
99.  Id.
 100.  Id. at 734. 
 101.  Id. at 736. Interestingly, the district court also found no evidence showing 
that the housing authority considered the impact of its planned action on its 
overwhelmingly African American tenant population, which was contrary to 
provisions of a governing statute enacted after the origination of the loans, 1987’s 
Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1472(c). Id. 
Coupled with the disparate-impact finding, the court concluded that the housing 
authority had failed to “affirmatively further fair housing.” Id. 
 102.  Id. at 733–34. 
 103.  Id. at 740–41. 
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that no matter which relevant population was used as a 
comparison, the statistics presented proved the disparate impact: 
“[Plaintiff’s] proof established a disproportionate impact upon 
minority class members whether we examine the relevant waiting 
list population, the income-eligible population, or the actual 
[project tenants].”104 
Shifting the burden to the housing authority’s 
deconcentration policy justification, Judge Melloy agreed with the 
district court that the policy objectives were unsupported by the 
evidence presented and therefore pretextual.105 As a matter of fact, 
the housing authority overstated the number of low-income rental 
units located in the project area.106 Crime statistics and the success 
of various anti-drug initiatives implemented over the years showed 
no actual concentration of criminal activity or drug use.107 Housing 
authority records showed the project to be financially stable with 
“multiple sources of untapped funding” for needed 
improvements.108 Judge Melloy carefully noted that it had not been 
the “general goal of deconcentration” that had been challenged. 
Rather, in this instance the statistics showed a loss of affordable 
housing borne almost only by African Americans. The housing 
authority failed to show an actual need for deconcentration and in 
fact had “falsely represented” the facts in its attempt to do so.109 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Charleston Housing Authority 
provided fair-housing advocates with valuable insights about the 
use of statistics in meeting prima facie disparate-impact criteria. It 
specifically endorsed the plaintiffs’ use of statistics to demonstrate 
the disproportionate impact of new policies on the racial minorities 
making up the vast majority of that housing’s tenant population. It 
also identified various relevant populations that could be 
considered in determining the disparate impact. The decision was 
also helpful to housing advocates who bring similar claims and 
refuse to accept a deconcentration policy that is pretextual and 
unsupported by evidence. Accordingly, Charleston Housing Authority 
should serve as a blueprint for proving disparate impact in 
 104.  Id. at 741. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 741–42. 
 109.  Id. at 742. 
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situations involving destruction of existing low-income housing 
properties. 
2. Neighborhood Opposition to Supportive Housing for the Disabled
Defeated in Ventura Village, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis
Also in 2005, the Eighth Circuit was called to resolve a 
Minneapolis neighborhood clash over city approval of publicly-
funded housing for the disabled. Project for Pride in Living, a local 
housing developer long known for its strong voice in the fight for 
low-income housing, proposed a 20-unit, 128-person supportive 
housing facility in south-central Minneapolis.110 This location was 
and is at the heart of the city’s south-side African American 
population.111 The purpose of the housing development was to 
provide much needed permanent housing and rehabilitative 
services for homeless families with disabled members, including 
those with mental illness and substance abuse problems.112 The 
developer applied for and was granted a conditional use permit 
allowing the development, which was required because local zoning 
rules prohibited spacing of such supportive housing facilities too 
close to each other.113 The local neighborhood association objected 
to another such facility and sued under the Fair Housing Act.114 
The lawsuit claimed that the city’s approval of the permit was illegal 
housing discrimination because its waiver policy had the effect of 
concentrating supportive housing in a small number of densely 
populated urban neighborhoods and therefore perpetuated 
segregation of minorities and the disabled.115 The claims did not 
find favor with the district court, which dismissed the action on 
summary judgment; the neighborhood association appealed, to no 
avail.116 
In affirming the district court’s decision, Judge Loken wrote 
for a panel that included Judge Riley and Judge Smith. The 
110.  Ventura Vill., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 419 F.3d 725, 726 (8th Cir. 
2005). 
 111.  See Ventura Village Neighborhood, MINN. COMPASS, 
http://www.mncompass.org/profiles/neighborhoods/minneapolis/ventura          
-village (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
 112.  Ventura Vill., 419 F3d at 727. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 726–27. 
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neighborhood association did not present sufficient evidence to 
prove discriminatory enforcement of the city’s spacing 
ordinance.117 The city approved every application for supportive 
housing developments in the previous ten years and more than half 
had been located in majority white neighborhoods, which resulted 
in no actual increased concentration of minority segregation.118 
Rather, Judge Loken wryly noted, “the City has taken a single race-
neutral action—the grant of a waiver of its spacing requirement—
that permitted the creation of additional supportive housing and 
thereby increased the housing available to eligible handicapped 
persons.”119 Judge Loken went on to note the absence of case law 
authority upholding fair-housing liability in instances where 
additional housing was created “absent proof that the action was 
part of a discriminatory policy or practice of refusing to approve 
other housing.”120 Judge Loken then concluded that even if the 
city’s “liberal” waiver policy had increased the concentration of 
supportive housing, “the concentration is attributable to the 
independent siting decisions of private housing providers . . . not to 
any City action ‘making unavailable’ or ‘denying’ housing 
opportunities on the basis of race or disability.”121 
Despite the pro-low-income housing outcome of Ventura 
Village, it cannot be viewed as encouragement to disparate-impact 
theories of liability, particularly when applied to allegations that a 
certain housing policy increases minority population concentration 
in urban areas and perpetuates segregation. Rather, it underscores 
the importance of developing an evidentiary record clearly showing 
a causal connection between the housing policy complained of and 
any consequent disparate impact. 
C. 2010: Disparate-Impact Claims Rescued in Gallagher v. Magner 
The Twin Cities were again the locus of low-income housing 
controversy amid the rather unconventional fair-housing disparate-
impact claims brought in Gallagher v. Magner.122 Saint Paul landlords 
banded together to challenge what they considered to be the city’s 
 117.  Id. at 728. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
122.  619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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aggressive enforcement of its housing code.123 They brought a 
cluster of lawsuits that were consolidated and heard by the federal 
district court.124 The landlord plaintiffs contended that the city was 
enforcing its housing code more aggressively against their 
properties because of the disproportionately high concentration of 
racial minorities in their tenant population, and, even if no specific 
discriminatory animus was present, this had an illegal disparate 
impact and perpetuated racial segregation in Saint Paul.125 In 
opposing defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs 
apparently showered the beleaguered district court with 
“voluminous materials—four file boxes worth.”126 The court 
responded by granting summary judgment, dismissing all claims.127  
The inevitable appeal met a similar fate, except for the disparate-
impact claim, which the Eighth Circuit panel reversed and 
remanded. 128 
Writing for the panel, Judge Melloy held that the district 
court’s interpretation of the facially benign policy or practice at 
work in the city’s code enforcement scheme was too narrow.129 The 
court defined the plaintiff’s prima facie burden as requiring a 
showing that “a facially neutral policy ha[d] a significant adverse 
impact on members of a protected minority group.”130 Importantly, 
the city action at issue was not a city code coming into conflict with 
federal housing quality standards.131 Rather, the challenged action 
was the city’s enforcement of the housing code along with 
numerous allegations, supported by record evidence, that the city 
had played fast and loose with the rules, issued code violations that 
were false, and punished property owners without prior 
notification or opportunity to remedy problems.132 The court 
 123.  Id. at 824. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 832 (quoting Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 
1020 (D. Minn. 2008)) (noting the district court’s “frustration” that plaintiffs had 
“failed to ‘winnow out the relevant documents,’” and therefore “the burden of 
doing so fell to the Court”). 
 127.  Id. at 823. 
 128.  Id. at 823. The panel consisted of Judges Wollman, Bye, and Melloy. Id. 
 129.  Id. at 832. 
 130.  Id. at 833 (quoting Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 
883 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
 131.  Id. at 834. 
 132.  Id. 
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concluded that the evidence, at least at the summary judgment 
stage, sufficiently demonstrated disparate impact, specifically 
evidence of: (1) a shortage of affordable housing caused by the 
enforcement scheme; (2) the parties’ stipulation that African 
Americans made up a disproportionate percentage of households 
relying on federally subsidized low-income housing in the city; and 
(3) increased costs to property owners from housing code 
enforcement.133 All of this had, as a matter of fact, resulted in an 
actual loss of affordable housing in the city, as shown by 
government records predicting a consequent loss of affordable 
housing and a nearly 300% increase in vacant housing in Saint Paul 
in 2003–2007.134 In so protecting the disparate-impact theory of 
liability asserted by the plaintiff landlords, Judge Melloy 
acknowledged the lack of evidence “connect[ing] the dots of . . . 
[the] claim” but explained that “[w]here a plaintiff demonstrates 
that a protected group depends on low-income housing to a 
greater extent than the non-protected population, other courts 
have found it reasonable to infer that the non-protected group will 
experience a disproportionate adverse effect from a policy or 
decision that reduces low-income housing.”135 In other words, the 
key to establishing a challenged policy’s disparate impact through 
comparing levels of dependence on affordable housing by different 
classes of people was to show that the net result of the policy 
actually resulted in reduced low-income housing. This was a boon 
to any litigant seeking to preserve low-income housing 
opportunities through court action. 
Moving through the rest of the disparate-impact burden-
shifting analysis, the court quickly ratified the rather obvious 
relationship of the code enforcement scheme to the legitimate, 
non-discriminatory objectives of habitable, safe, and livable 
neighborhoods.136 The burden then fell back on the plaintiff 
landlords to offer a viable alternative that satisfied the city’s 
legitimate policy objectives while reducing the discriminatory 
impact of the challenged enforcement practices.137 The plaintiffs 
identified previous, gentler code enforcement programs used by 
the city that they preferred, and this was apparently enough for 
 133.  Id. at 834–35. 
 134.  Id. at 835. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 837. 
 137.  Id. 
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Judge Melloy and the Eighth Circuit panel.138 The old programs 
were more collaborative in nature and had reportedly been 
effective enough—conclusions corroborated by record evidence of 
statements from a cross section of stakeholders and the city’s 
failure to show that the discarded enforcement scheme was costlier 
or would fail to accomplish its policy objectives.139 Judge Melloy’s 
opinion concluded that disputed issues of fact existed that the old 
code enforcement program “generated a cooperative relationship 
with property owners, achieved greater code compliance, and 
resulted in less financial burdens on rental property owners,” and 
that “[i]t was reasonable to infer from these facts . . . that [the old 
code enforcement program] would significantly reduce the impact 
on protected class members.”140 
Issuing the Gallagher decision and remanding for further 
proceedings on the disparate-impact claim did not, unfortunately, 
resolve the case, which is still pending.141 The disparate-impact 
claim preserved by the Eighth Circuit was reportedly stayed 
pending the Inclusive Communities decision;142 the case presently 
awaits further disposition with the district court.143 
After Gallagher and the Supreme Court’s criticism of Gallagher’s 
disparate-impact claims in Inclusive Communities, it is difficult to 
envision a case like Gallagher succeeding today. Indeed, a 
subsequent lawsuit alleging similar disparate-impact claims—this 
time against the City of Minneapolis and its alleged heightened 
enforcement of housing inspection policies—was met with less 
judicial tolerance and failed to meet Inclusive Communities’ stricter 
 138.  Id. at 837–38. 
 139.  Id. at 838. 
 140.  Id. 
141.  Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (D. Minn. 2008), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 
2010). 
 142.  Id. The docket for the case (No. 04-cv-02632 in the Federal District Court 
of Minnesota) reads on January 30, 2015: “The case is stayed until the related 
Supreme Court Decision is released. A trial date will be determined in the future 
by Chief Judge Davis.” 
 143.  See Gallagher v. Magner, 636 F.3d 380, 381 (8th Cir. 2010) (denying 
appellant’s petition for a hearing en banc). The dissent in the case noted that 
whether “application of disparate-impact analysis to a city’s aggressive housing 
code enforcement is dictated by the purpose of the FHA is an important question 
of first impression.” Id. at 384 (Colloton, J., dissenting). 
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causality standards for pleading disparate impact.144 In Ellis v. City of 
Minneapolis, landlords (represented by the same law firm involved 
in the Gallagher case) with fourteen rental dwellings (comprising a 
total of thirty-five units) in inner-city Minneapolis alleged that the 
City’s rental dwelling license scheme and its heightened standards 
displaced protected class families, which resulted in disparate 
impact.145 In dismissing the case on the pleadings, the federal 
district court cited Inclusive Communities’ “robust causality 
requirement” that plaintiffs must point to a defendant’s policy and 
the purported disparity to allege facts showing a causal 
connection.146 The plaintiffs’ failure to allege that any tenant was 
displaced or that rental licenses were lost due to anything other 
than actual code violations at their properties did not meet 
disparate-impact prima facie causation requirements after Inclusive 
Communities.147 
Accordingly, though feasibility of disparate-impact liability as a 
general matter is no longer in dispute, fair-housing advocates 
should carefully consider these judicial admonitions when 
considering which disparate-impact lawsuits are deserving of scarce 
litigation resources. The HUD disparate-impact rule, along with the 
added imprimatur of the Inclusive Communities decision, sets out 
basic rules of the road that all should now be able to follow. Still, 
advocates and courts will continue to struggle with defining where 
the boundary lies between upholding valid disparate-impact claims 
and the overregulation of actors attempting to navigate in good 
faith through an increasingly complex community housing 
landscape. 
D. Statistical Proof of Disparate-Impact Claims Fails in Keller v. City of 
Fremont 
More recently, the defeat of disparate-impact claims by the 
Eighth Circuit in Keller v. City of Fremont illustrates the perils of 
inadequate statistical presentation and analysis, as well as failure to 
correctly define the relevant comparison population.148 In 2013, 
 144.  Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-CV-3045, 2016 WL 1222227 (D. Minn. 
Mar. 28, 2016). 
 145.  Id. at *2. 
 146.  Id. at *11. 
 147.  Id. 
148.  719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013). 
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fair-housing disparate-impact litigation in this region involved the 
expression of virulent anti-immigrant sentiment in Fremont, 
Nebraska, a city of about 26,000 on the Platte River just west of 
Omaha.149 Voters there adopted a city ordinance that limited hiring 
and providing rental housing to “illegal aliens” and “unauthorized 
aliens.”150 Preceding the ordinance was a tripling of the city’s 
Hispanic population over a ten-year period, from 4.3% to 11.9% of 
the overall city population.151 
Some of the less savory aspects of the ordinance involved the 
absolute prohibition on renting to “illegal aliens” and the 
consequent requirement that any prospective adult renter register 
with city authorities by obtaining (and paying for) an occupancy 
license from the city.152 The licensure process included submission 
of proof of immigration status.153 Subsequent discovery of a renter’s 
unlawful immigration status would, in and of itself, breach the 
lease.154 Other enforcement mechanisms included cumbersome 
immigration verification processes to be done by police officers and 
a $100 fine to landlords, per day, per violation.155 
Various individuals and entities allied against this measure, 
including a local union and the ACLU, by filing suit immediately; 
the collective parties challenged the ordinance on its face as 
unconstitutional, pre-empted by federal immigration laws, and 
discriminatory under the Fair Housing Act.156 Chief Judge Laurie 
Camp heard the case on cross motions for summary judgment and 
found fair-housing violations.157 Both sides appealed this decision 
and the Eighth Circuit panel hearing the case (Judges Loken, 
Bright, and Colloton) reversed the fair-housing ruling.158 
Writing for the majority, with Judge Bright dissenting, Judge 
Loken’s primary complaint about the fair-housing disparate-impact 
claims focused on how the relevant demographic statistics had 
 149.  Fremont Area Chamber of Commerce, History: Community Overview, 
VILLAGEPROFILE.COM 10, 12 (2012), 
https://issuu.com/villageprofile/docs/fremont_ne. 
 150.  Keller, 719 F.3d at 937. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 938. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 937. 
157.  Keller v. City of Fremont, 853 F. Supp. 2d 959, 982–83 (D. Neb. 2012). 
 158.  Keller, 719 F.3d at 951. 
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been presented to the district court.159 He concluded that what had 
been put into evidence did not meet long-standing Eighth Circuit 
order-of-proof standards. Specifically, plaintiffs had failed to even 
meet their prima facie burden: 
In this circuit, to prove a disparate-impact violation of the 
FHA, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case, that 
is, “that the objected-to action results in, or can be 
predicted to result in, a disparate impact upon a 
protected class compared to a relevant population as a 
whole.”160 
The identified protected class was Latinos, but no 
corresponding “specific disparate impact” had been identified; 
“simply referring to the likelihood ‘that enforcing the Ordinance 
would result in a reduction of the Hispanic population in 
Fremont’” was not enough.161 The other end of the comparison was 
similarly lacking: plaintiffs had apparently made “no attempt to 
identify the ‘relevant population’ to be compared, other than citing 
statistics showing that a large number of the City’s foreign-born 
population came from Latin American countries.”162 Judge Loken 
then queried, “Is the relevant comparison the Ordinance’s impact 
on all aliens not lawfully present, on all aliens, on all renters, or on 
the City’s entire population? [Plaintiffs] do not tell us, and their 
conclusory analysis of the issue provides no answer.”163 
When examined in light of the Fair Housing Act’s history and 
mandate to reduce segregation (primarily racial in nature), Judge 
Loken was reluctant to impose disparate-impact liability in a 
situation where individuals of a certain legal status (undocumented 
immigrants) were the target of an adverse action and not a specific 
racial or ethnic group. A disparate-impact claim solely “based on 
the effect an otherwise lawful ordinance may have on a sub-group 
of the unprotected class of aliens not lawfully present in this 
country,” was accordingly, in a word, “unsound.”164 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. at 948 (citing Charleston Hous. Auth. v. USDA, 419 F.3d 729, 740–41 
(8th Cir. 2005)). 
 161.  Id. at 949. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 949. Judge Loken went on to examine the second and third steps in 
a disparate-impact order-of-proof analysis and found his determination on the 
prima facie issue “reinforced.” Id. “[C]ities and municipalities may have both a 
legitimate local interest in restricting the number of unlawfully present aliens 
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After Keller, how can practitioners in this Circuit use disparate-
impact claims to protect clients from such anti-immigrant policies, 
which are perhaps only proxies for race? Would it have made a 
difference if plaintiffs presented statistics accounting for which 
foreign-born Latinos were living in Fremont legally and which were 
not? What if plaintiffs had shown that these particular Latinos, 
born elsewhere (as opposed to the large and growing Latino 
population living here for generations, in some cases well before 
whites), were residing in Fremont legally but were adversely 
impacted by the rental ordinance nonetheless? 
It may be that scenarios with this sort of factual and historical 
complexity are not the best fit for the blunter tool of disparate-
impact theories of liability. This is doubly so when some of the 
measures taken are consistent with other areas of federal law, 
however anathema to political progressives. Accordingly, housing 
advocates will likely benefit from a more thorough examination of 
possible consequences before going down the disparate-impact 
path, especially when the case is one of first impression. 
V. DISPARATE IMPACT TODAY IN THE TWIN CITIES 
A. Crossroads: Disparate-Impact Claims Proceed Against Private Owners 
of Affordable Housing in Richfield 
This year, the Minnesota federal district court denied a 
defendant apartment owner’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ fair-
housing claims in Crossroads Residents Organized for Stable & Secure 
Residencies v. MSP Crossroads Apartments LLC.165 The class action 
lawsuit alleged, among other things, disparate-impact claims under 
the Fair Housing Act arising out of the new owners’ efforts to 
gentrify rental housing that had previously been a mainstay for 
affordable housing in the metro area.166 Located in the first-ring 
suburb of Richfield, just south of Minneapolis, the apartment 
complex had 698 lower-rent units housing more than 2200 
residing within their borders and a rational basis for enforcing a particular 
restriction.” Id. Furthermore, plaintiffs identified no viable alternative means of 
carrying out this purpose that would not have the same discriminatory effect on 
“the portion of unlawfully present aliens who are Latino.” Id. 
165.  No. 16-cv-233, 2016 WL 3661146, at *1 (D. Minn. July 5, 2016). 
 166.  Cf. id. at *2–4 (the new owners planned to update each unit’s kitchen 
and add new amenities in the common areas). 
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residents167 and was described as “perhaps the largest source of 
unsubsidized affordable rental housing in the Twin Cities 
Region.”168 The tenant population there had historically been 
“generally lower income, with a significant number of ethnic 
minority or disabled tenants.”169 
The tenants and advocacy organization that brought the case 
alleged that the new owners, after purchasing the property in 2015, 
required tenants to apply for new leases to remain in their 
homes.170 Shortly after, they dramatically raised rents and adopted 
exclusionary occupancy policies such as screening criteria 
requiring high credit scores and income three times the rent.171 
Section 8 vouchers were no longer accepted, and the combination 
of the higher rents and new screening criteria effectively precluded 
the continued residency of any tenant receiving disability-related 
housing funding support.172 All this, plaintiffs claimed, adversely 
impacted racial minorities and disabled tenants, forcing them out 
of their homes.173 Further, the change “offset virtually all of the 
production on new affordable housing in the Metro area in 2014,” 
thereby setting back affordable housing production efforts.174 
In denying the new owners’ motion to dismiss the fair-housing 
disparate-impact claim, Judge Montgomery looked to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities, as well as the HUD 
disparate-impact rule, “[finding] enough factual allegations [in 
plaintiffs’ Complaint] to support an inference” that statistical 
analysis would show disparate impact.175 Specific allegations that 
showed a plausible claim of disparate impact included allegations: 
that approximately 35 tenants relied on Section 8 
vouchers and 100 tenants relied on GRH vouchers; that 
many if not most of these tenants belong to one or more 
protected classes; and that Defendants’ policies will force 
all of these tenants to relocate. More generally, Plaintiffs 
 167.  Id. at *1. 
 168.  Id. at *1 (quoting plaintiffs’ Complaint). 
 169.  Id. at *2. 
 170.  Id. at *3. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
174.  Press Release, Hous. Justice Cent., U.S. District Court Denies Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fair Housing Claims Against New Owners of 
Crossroads Apartments in Richfield (June 6, 2016) (on file with author). 
 175.  Crossroads, 2016 WL 3661146 at *6–7. 
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allege that protected class members are overrepresented 
at the complex as compared to the surrounding area; that 
a high percentage of protected class members in the Twin 
Cities are low-income renters; and that Defendants’ new 
rents and rental criteria pose a high hurdle for low-
income renters.176 
The success of the Crossroads case in surviving past the 
pleadings stage shows the continuing viability of the disparate-
impact tool in this jurisdiction for preservation of affordable 
housing, especially when the demographic statistics of affected 
tenant populations are so striking.177 It is not unusual for minority 
tenants facing the brunt of redevelopment activities to approach 
legal aid offices for assistance in these situations.178 Fair-housing 
advocates can now respond with the heightened prospect of time 
consuming and expensive disparate-impact litigation in urging 
housing developers to keep the interests of low-income minority 
tenants in mind as they engage in gentrification efforts. This will 
hopefully spur more just and equitable community development 
efforts in the future. 
B. The MICAH HUD Complaints: Twin Cities Nonprofit and Suburbs 
Challenge LIHTC Funding Allocation in HUD Complaints Alleging 
Claims of Disparate Impact/Failure to Affirmatively Further Fair 
Housing 
One aspect of the current landscape in disparate-impact 
litigation in the Upper Midwest involves the allocation of federal 
LIHTC funds around the Twin Cities, which some in the fair-
housing movement believe has intensified concentration of 
housing segregation into low-income, low-opportunity areas in the 
inner city.179 The argument is that not only does federal fair-
housing law require that allocation of scarce housing funding be 
 176.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 177.  Rigel C. Oliveri, Disparate Impact and Integration: With TDHCA v. Inclusive 
Communities the Supreme Court Retains an Uneasy Status Quo, 24 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 267 (2015). 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  See Shannon Prather, Brooklyn Park, Brooklyn Center Accuse State of Fair-
Housing Violations, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.) (Sept. 20, 2014, 10:22 PM), 
http://www.startribune.com/brooklyn-park-brooklyn-center-accuse-state-of-fair      
-housing-violations/275901391/. 
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done in a non-discriminatory manner, it must also affirmatively 
further fair housing.180 
As part of the local Twin Cities fair-housing movement, 
Michael Allen of Relman of Dane & Colfax in Washington, D.C., 
teamed up with Myron Orfield of the University of Minnesota Law 
School’s Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity.181 Together, they 
filed two complaints with HUD on behalf of various community 
nonprofit stakeholders: one in November 2014 (the “November 
Complaint”)182 and the other a few months later, in March 2015 
(the “March Complaint”).183 The November Complaint, which was 
successfully conciliated by HUD before commencement of any 
investigatory activities, was brought on behalf of the Metropolitan 
Interfaith Council on Affordable Housing (“MICAH”) and the 
cities of Brooklyn Park, Brooklyn Center, and Richfield.184 
The November Complaint alleged discrimination by the 
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency and the Metropolitan Council 
of the Twin Cities (the “Met Council”) based on race and/or 
national origin through the administration of federally funded 
housing and community development programs, as well as LIHTC 
program tax credits.185 The complaint set out statistics for 
demographic changes in Brooklyn Park, Brooklyn Center, and 
Richfield showing dramatically increased racial segregation and 
poverty.186 This, they alleged, disparately impacted nonwhites and 
 180.  See Valerie Schneider, In Defense of Disparate Impact: Urban Redevelopment 
and the Supreme Court’s Recent Interest in the Fair Housing Act, 79 MO. L. REV. 539 
(2014). 
 181.  Housing Discrimination Complaint, Metro. Interfaith Council on 
Affordable Hous. v. Minnesota (Nov. 15, 2014), https://dk-media 
.s3.amazonaws.com/AA/AV/micahorg/downloads/292213/Complaint_Final 
_Filed_2014_11_10.pdf [hereinafter “The November Complaint”]. 
 182.  See id. 
 183.  Housing Discrimination Complaint, Metro. Interfaith Council on 
Affordable Hous. v. City of Minneapolis (Mar. 30, 2015), http://dk-media 
.s3.amazonaws.com/AA/AV/micahorg/downloads/294541/MICAH_Complaint 
_to_HUD_-_Mpls._and_St._Paul_filed_March_30__2015.pdf [hereinafter “The 
March Complaint”]. 
184.  Brooklyn Park and Brooklyn Center are two cities located to the north 
and northwest of one of Minneapolis’s historic African American neighborhoods: 
North Minneapolis. Richfield is directly south of Minneapolis’s Southside 
neighborhoods, similarly segregated by race and home to many in the Twin Cities’ 
Somali community. 
185.  The November Complaint, supra note 181, at 2–9. 
 186.  Id. at 3–4. 
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Hispanics and violated obligations, as recipients of federal low-
income housing funds, “to take affirmative steps to overcome 
impediments to fair-housing choice.”187 Targeted for particular 
approbation was the regional analysis of fair-housing impediments, 
which most local housing advocates had long criticized as grossly 
inadequate.188 
The HUD-mediated conciliation proceedings resulted in 
agreement on a process to better understand Twin Cities metro 
low-income housing needs as a geographic whole, which would 
presumably lead to a fair and balanced allocation of federal 
housing funding dollars between urban and suburban recipients. 
Terms of the settlement included funding from HUD to add an 
addendum to the regional analysis of fair-housing impediments 
addressing the requirement that the cities specifically examine 
issues raised in the complaint, including: “how the region 
distributes its affordable housing; whether the way the region 
distributes low-income housing tax credits ‘reinforces existing 
racial or ethnic concentrations of poverty or perpetuates racial or 
ethnic segregation’; whether zoning codes reinforce existing 
concentrations; and how the region’s other housing policies 
reinforce those concentrations.”189 
The March Complaint, submitted by MICAH and three 
Minneapolis neighborhood associations, contained similar 
allegations that low-income housing funding was overly 
concentrated in poor inner city areas.190 One statistical finding in 
this second complaint was that in high-minority census tracts in 
Minneapolis there was an average of one affordable housing unit 
for every block, while in low-minority tracts there was one 
affordable housing unit every 6.5 miles.191 At last report, the March 
Complaint is still pending and HUD is actively investigating its 
allegations.192 The parties have met face-to-face twice, and housing 
 187.  Id. at 2–4. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Peter Callaghan, Settlement Could Alter How Affordable Housing is Built 
Throughout Twin Cities Metro, MINNPOST (May 13, 2016), 
https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2016/05/settlement-could-alter-how    
-affordable-housing-built-throughout-twin-cities-m. 
 190.  See The March Complaint, supra note 183, at 3. 
 191.  Id. at 5. 
192.  Interview with Michael Allen, Esq., Relman, Dane & Colfax PLLC (July 8, 
2016). 
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advocates hope that HUD is taking the matter seriously enough to 
move things forward toward conciliation.193 The complainants’ 
endgame is to use the updated regional analysis of impediments to 
inform decisions about housing funding allocation, which, in turn, 
should lead to better outcomes for residents.194 It is their belief that 
a more ideal balance of low-income housing dollars between urban 
and suburban locations would be in line with historical funding 
patterns from the 1970s and 1980s when state and local housing 
funding decision makers considered community preferences for 
housing and educational infrastructure in a more genuine 
manner.195 
 Meanwhile, a nineteen-member advisory committee has 
convened and is meeting regularly to advise the Fair Housing 
Implementation Council on the process of amending the regional 
analysis of impediments.196 The Council includes stakeholders from 
around the region, including the city manager of Brooklyn Park, 
the mayor of Richfield, neighborhood association representatives, 
and Legal Aid.197 Some of the housing advocates participating in 
these proceedings have a different view of where funding allocation 
should end up, believing that the 60%-40% urban-suburban split 
stated by the MICAH complainants is, in fact, closer to 50%-50%.198 
Some offer a different perspective altogether on the tax credit 
allocation issue, arguing that housing funding resources ought not 
be taken away from inner-city communities but should rather be 
used to build or preserve affordable, safe housing to improve places 
where people already live.199 Commentators urge that the focus in 
updating the regional analysis of impediments should be on the 
kind of robust community engagement that will truly inform how 
funding allocations will actually affect impoverished communities, 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
196.  Interview with Lael Robertson, Esq., Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid (July 15, 
2016). 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  See generally Thomas B. Edsall, Where Should a Poor Family Live?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/opinion/where-should-a 
-poor-family-live.html?_r=0 (“[P]reservation of existing affordable housing and 
reinvestment in distressed or gentrifying neighborhoods must be considered as 
valid strategies equal to mobility and moving to high opportunity areas.”). 
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as well as on including enforcement mechanisms that advocates 
can use if the cities fail to follow the outlined steps.200 
C. What Potential Cases Are on the Horizon? 
An issue currently of interest to fair-housing advocates in the 
Twin Cities involves the trend of setting aside LIHTC dollars and 
other federally funded housing resources to support local arts 
communities and, more specifically, local artists. On its face, this 
would seem to be an appropriate solution to the age-old problem 
of arts patronage, especially in a mid-size regional capital like the 
Twin Cities without the institutionalized resources available to 
artists in, say, New York City or San Francisco. The need is 
especially acute in today’s public fiscal conservativism; many of the 
resources available to support artists in the past, such as National 
Endowment for the Arts grants, have essentially gone away, 
especially for those who pursue art with controversial images or 
themes.201 
When government funds are made available for this sort of 
dedicated housing, however, fair-housing laws still apply and 
require rental policies to be nondiscriminatory.202 What’s more, 
federal fair-housing laws require communities receiving federal 
funds for low-income housing development to take affirmative 
steps to further fair housing.203 This includes engaging in 
appropriate and culturally competent affirmative marketing efforts 
to ensure diverse tenant populations that mirror the communities 
around them.204 
All of this is sharply at odds with the reality of majority-white 
tenant populations in local low-income arts housing 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  See, e.g., National Endowment for the Arts Appropriations History, NAT’L 
ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, https://www.arts.gov/open-government/national          
-endowment-arts-appropriations-history (last visited Oct. 19, 2016). 
 202.  See Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP), U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URBAN 
DEV. http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing 
_equal_opp/partners/FHAP (last visited Oct. 19, 2016) (“To be eligible for 
assistance through the FHAP, a state or local agency must demonstrate to HUD 
that it enforces a fair housing law that is substantially equivalent to the federal Fair 
Housing Act.”). 
 203.  See HUD Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 
(July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903). 
 204.  Id. 
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developments.205 For example, the Pillsbury A-Mill artist lofts in 
Minneapolis were recently completed at a total cost of about $170 
million, using around $35 million in affordable housing tax credit 
proceeds.206 Billed as “An Artist Community” and marketed as 
“Artist Lofts! Amazing Location! Art Meets Affordable!”,207 the A-
Mill Lofts are located close to the newly revitalized Mississippi 
Riverfront area adjacent to downtown Minneapolis. Close to local 
arts powerhouses such as the Guthrie Theater and the MacPhail 
music school, the A-Mill Lofts itself boasts arts amenities such as 
multiple studios and rehearsal spaces.208 Years ago, starving artists 
who stayed in the Twin Cities would have sacrificed much for this 
sort of on-site accessibility. But a quick look at tenant demographics 
at the A-Mill Lofts indicates that the population now living there 
heavily skews towards white residents (86%, in an urban area where 
traditional subsidized housing residents are 80% minority)209 with 
incomes far above what one would expect in low-income housing.210 
Many question this use of federal low-income housing funds to 
help support local arts communities, arguing that it fails fair-
housing criteria and certainly falls short of any goal to affirmatively 
further fair housing.211 The countervailing argument is that this 
 205.  See Alana Semuels, The Artist Loft: Affordable Housing (for White People), THE 
ATLANTIC (May 19, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/05 
/affordable-housing-for-white-people/483444/ (quoting Jay Wilkerson of Mid-
Minnesota Legal Aid). 
 206.  INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, THE RISE OF WHITE-SEGREGATED SUBSIDIZED 
HOUSING 17 (2016), https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/15/8a 
/158a9849bb744b4573b59f51e4f0ab54/IMO-White-Segregated-Subsidized
-Housing-5-18-2016.pdf. 
 207.  See A-MILL ARTIST LOFTS, http://www.a-millartistlofts.com (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2016). 
 208.  See About, A-MILL ARTIST LOFTS, http://www.a-millartistlofts.com/about/ 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2016). 
 209.  Semuels, supra note 205. 
 210.  See Reserve Info, A-MILL ARTIST LOFTS, http://www.a-millartistlofts.com/ 
reserve-info/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2016). 
 211.  See Editorial Board, Federal Tax Credits Are Misused on Costly Artist Lofts in 
Twin Cities, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.) (June 16, 2016), 
http://www.startribune.com/federal-tax-credits-are-misused-on-costly-artist-lofts-in 
-twin-cities/383350961/ (“[I]t verges on irresponsible to squander federal housing 
tax credits on projects that benefit so few.”); see also Editorial Board, Who Gets the 
Subsidized Apartments?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.) (Jul. 5, 2016), 
http://www.startribune.com/federal-tax-credits-are-misused-on-costly-artist-lofts-in 
-twin-cities/383350961/ (“HUD needs to make sure all subsidized housing—
including artist housing—meets [fair housing] goals.”). 
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funding goes to costly historic building renovations and can help 
high-income neighborhoods become more economically diverse.212 
The resulting majority-white tenant populations in such housing 
developments, however, may indicate potential fair-housing 
disparate-impact violations. 
Although the IRS has made a special exemption (sought by 
Minneapolis developers) for artist housing from the tax credit 
requirement that such housing be available for “general public 
use,” the fact that so few minorities actually live there raises 
discrimination red flags, particularly with regard to how tenant 
screening procedures are being employed.213 Moreover, the fact 
that this is occurring in a state with such acute income inequality 
and persistent housing segregation makes it that much more 
suspect as a fair-housing matter. Some note that the use of low-
income tax credits for artist housing may distinguish Minnesota 
from the way Texas has been using its federal low-income housing 
dollars, as challenged in the Inclusive Communities case.214 Arguably, 
a challenge to this method of federal tax credit allocation might 
present a stronger case for fair-housing disparate-impact liability 
than that which so troubled the Supreme Court in Inclusive 
Communities. It should not matter that artist housing funded by 
federal low-income tax credit proceeds in Minnesota forms a 
comparatively small percentage of subsidized housing 
opportunities; what is important are the consequences of diverting 
these scarce resources away from needed low-income housing in 
the Twin Cities. It is an open question whether the $460 million 
spent on just four artist housing developments in Minneapolis and 
Saint Paul could have created 6000 units of more typical affordable 
housing215 and how much opportunity has consequently been lost 
to reduce housing segregation. 
VI. CONCLUSION
As housing advocates go about our work, we should bear in 
mind that disparate-impact litigation brought under the auspices of 
the FHA these days means treading in uncertain waters. Things can 
212.  See Semuels, supra note 205. 
 213.  See id. 
 214.  Interview, Myron Orfield, Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity, 
University of Minnesota Law School, June 28, 2016. 
215.  Editorial Board, STAR TRIB., supra note 211. 
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go awry quickly if careful choices are not made about which cases 
to push forward and what resources are used in the process. At the 
same time, we cannot pass up chances to assist our clients in 
enforcing their right to fair housing by pushing the law forward 
when opportunities present themselves. 
Disparate-impact litigation around the country, the new HUD 
rule, the Supreme Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities, and 
recent cases brought here in the Twin Cities have shifted the fair-
housing landscape. From the new HUD disparate-impact rule, we 
now have a plainly stated, three-part burden-shifting test that 
should allow stakeholders to at least start from the same page in 
analyzing developments in housing policy, developments in low-
income housing funding, and those developments’ impact on 
perpetuating protected class segregation. From the Supreme 
Court’s warnings in Inclusive Communities and how that case has 
been applied to disparate-impact cases since, as well as the Eighth 
Circuit’s treatment of fair-housing disparate-impact cases brought 
here in the Midwest in recent years, we can better assess the 
litigation prospects of challenging various kinds of housing 
development proposals and scenarios. 
Going forward, disparate-impact theories of liability will 
undoubtedly take a more prominent role in addressing housing 
segregation and its attendant racial and income inequality. To be 
sure, efforts by local developers to gentrify new rental housing 
acquisitions that result in large displacements of tenants belonging 
to protected classes, such as is being currently challenged in 
Richfield in Crossroads, should be scrutinized by fair-housing 
advocates using disparate-impact analysis. The use of federal low-
income housing tax credit funding in artist housing developments, 
particularly when such residential populations skew so heavily 
towards middle- and high-income whites, should similarly raise fair-
housing disparate-impact concerns. The recently clarified burden-
shifting test formalized in the HUD disparate-impact rule should 
breathe new life into efforts to defeat policies such as criminal 
records tenant screening requirements and posting income three 
times the rent. Past and developing Eighth Circuit and Supreme 
Court jurisprudence increases our understanding of which 
scenarios best lend themselves to disparate-impact analysis and 
effective fair-housing advocacy. 
Meanwhile, the struggle continues to meet the needs of those 
most impacted by lack of housing choice and barriers to reducing 
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residential segregation. As Prince implores in the lyrics opening 
this article, fair-housing advocates must indeed “lend a helping 
hand” to solve these problems and work together.216 Advocates can 
serve an important role in identifying issues and developments that 
contribute, in a systemic manner, to the day-to-day housing 
problems experienced by our client communities. Community 
organizations and their advocates must do everything possible to 
make mechanisms for assessing community input on housing policy 
as robust and genuine as possible. The bottom line is that 
stakeholders must collaborate effectively with each other to 
prioritize what resources to put into play to push change forward in 
the most positive and constructive manner possible. 
All of this is complicated by the enduring constant of change. 
Local, regional, and national economies ebb and flow irrespective 
of fair-housing activities and arguably play a larger role in how 
housing development actually moves forward.217 Individual families 
come and go as they pursue economic and educational 
opportunities, regardless of the pace of housing policy 
development or the evolving insights of fair-housing advocates.218 
Developments in transportation and communication technologies 
further impact these migration patterns.219 
Advocates must accordingly be flexible and skilled enough in 
communicating with stakeholders on all sides to anticipate and 
effectively deal with these sorts of changes. After all, little of these 
underlying economic and social dynamics tends to bear much 
relation to the judicial court process. Much of the challenge to fair-
housing advocates in coming years will be to sort out what dispute 
resolution mechanisms are best employed for the various housing 
problems that present themselves. Disparate-impact theories of 
liability will accordingly be a useful addition to the legal toolbox for 
improving housing conditions and opportunities in the years to 
come. 
 216.  PRINCE, supra note 1. 
 217.  See John Muellbauer & Anthony Murphy, Housing Markets and the 
Economy: The Assessment, 24 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 1 (2008) (explaining how 
the economy impacts the housing market), https://www.wu.ac.at/fileadmin 
/wu/d/i/iqv/Gstach/Artikel/Muellbauer_2008.pdf. 
 218.  See FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, RESEARCH DEP’T, WORKING PAPER 
697, UNDERSTANDING THE LONG-RUN DECLINE IN INTERSTATE MIGRATION 5 n.2
(2015), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/wp/wp697.pdf. 
 219.  Id. at 5. 
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